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The Deviance of the Zookeepers 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In May 1968 Alvin Gouldner published his attack on the ‘Becker School’ of 
sociology (‘The Sociologist as Partisan’).  The essay was a sometimes sarcastic and 
brutal but characteristically insightful and sharp critique of what he called the ‘Becker 
School’ of sociology – especially as it related to law-breaking and norm-transgressing 
outsiders.  In attacking the failure of ‘sceptical deviancy theory’ to confront the wider 
structural sources of power and authority, its seeming inability to address gross social 
divisions of wealth and status, and its lack of attention to the larger political and 
economic interests that were embedded in departments of State and industrial and 
financial corporations alike, Gouldner pinpointed with some accuracy the radical 
motivations of the soon-to-emerge ‘new criminology’ – in both its ‘left idealist’ and 
‘left realist’ guises.  What Gouldner’s essay really exposed was a certain kind of 
‘deviant imagination’ (c.f., Pearson, 1975) prevalent in the emerging critical 
criminologies of 1960s America (and then the UK, see Young, 1969).  In this paper I 
use Gouldner’s essay as a lens to investigate the ‘deviant imagination’ of 
contemporary critical criminologies and ask: who are the zookeepers of contemporary 
criminology and what is their deviant imagination? 
 
Key words: Gouldner, critical theory, zookeepers, deviance 
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The Deviance of the Zookeepers 
 
 
"You divide the people into two hostile camps of clownish boors and 
emasculated dwarfs. Good heavens! a nation divided into agricultural and 
commercial interests, calling itself sane; nay, styling itself enlightened and 
civilized, not only in spite of, but in consequence of this monstrous and 
unnatural division." (David Urquhart, l. c., p. 119).  This passage shows, at 
one and the same time, the strength and the weakness of that kind of criticism 
which knows how to judge and condemn the present, but not how to 
comprehend it.  
(Karl Marx: Capital I: 474fn) 
 
Presumably, I should now be able to dissect myself; ideally, and without 
defensiveness or self-flagellation, I should be able to outline my own major 
assumptions in some modestly coherent manner, if not evaluate them.  But I 
also believe that such an effort is doomed to failure.  For no man can be his 
own critic, and, in pretending that he can, he promises to deliver far more than 
he really wants. (Alvin Gouldner, 1970: 481) 
 
 
On critical theory 
 
I put these two quotes at the top of my paper not as a comment on the contents of 
what I analyse but as a reminder to myself that the task of critical theory (and of a 
critical theorist) is not only to demonstrate a competent and convincing 
comprehension of the world but also an awareness of the assumptions on which the 
demonstration rests.  I am, in fact, undecided about whether my own work would 
merit the epithet ‘critical’ but since the texts I discuss most certainly do then a small 
reminder of just how difficult it is to be ‘critical’ in any meaningful sense seems very 
much in order.  I make these observations because I want to preface my paper with a 
question that, in truth, others are far better qualified to answer.  The question is: what 
is critical about critical about critical criminology?  Underlying this question is a more 
basic and more general issue, viz: what distinguishes a critical theory from some other 
kind of theory – variously labelled in criminology as ‘conventional’, ‘mainstream’, 
‘traditional’ or, sometimes, ‘correctional’?  Of course, several responses can be made 
to this question: 
 
1. A critical theory might be defined in terms of the value commitment of the 
theorist – the theory is ‘critical’ to the extent that it is applied in order to 
achieve social change.  In this sense criticality is ‘opportunistic’ in that the 
theorist may adapt or manipulate (almost) any theoretical perspective to meet 
the task of challenging and changing the status quo. 
 
2. In an almost diametrically opposite sense, a theory might be critical in terms 
of the possibilities of the theory itself – that is, the theory is inherently 
transformational.  In this sense criticality is ‘immanent’ insofar as the 
application of the theory makes the world anew regardless of the values or 
intentions of the theorist. 
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3. A more familiar response might be to propose that the theory critiques existing 
arrangements from some morally or philosophically coded standpoint that 
reveals the iniquities or exploitative character of those arrangements.  In this 
sense criticality is ‘ethical’ in that the theory submits to some transcendental 
programme of emancipation. 
 
4. Finally, it might be responded that critical theory voices the silences of 
oppressed populations or describes the world contra the viewpoints of the 
powerful and/or exposes the ideological quality of those viewpoints.  In this 
sense criticality is ‘political’ in that it explicitly promotes the interests and/or 
ideologies of specific groups in struggle. 
 
This short list is not intended to be exhaustive but I think that it captures the main 
propositions that are put forward by criminologists who proclaim their work to be 
critical in contrast to ‘mainstream’ or ‘conventional’ criminology.  It also needs to be 
acknowledged at this point that, however mutually contradictory these responses are, 
they are nonetheless often combined in contemporary criminological writing.  I will 
return to these responses later in the paper but, here, I want to draw attention to a 
different dimension of any theory that is critical.  It is a dimension that is largely, 
though not completely, forgotten in criminology – like the sociologist who was its 
most ardent, and brilliant, professor – Alvin Gouldner.  The dimension that I want to 
draw attention to is the relationship between a theory and the world in which it is 
produced – the ‘reflexivity’ of theory.  Now, all theories, it goes without saying, are 
reflexive in some senses: they all exist in and demonstrate a relationship with the 
world in which they are produced.  For Gouldner, this fact does not exhibit the 
criticality of a theory because a critical theory not only knows this as a fact but, more 
importantly, is an exercise in showing what that relationship is.  A critical theory is a 
theory that knows how it exists in the world in which it is produced and, moreover, it 
knows how that world – and all of its challenges, perils and contradictions – exists 
within the theory.  A critical theory, for Gouldner, is not simply an exercise in 
critiquing existing knowledges, assumptions and arrangements – however talented he 
was at this.  It is, instead, an exhibition of how theory and world are critical partners 
in the pursuit of social transformation. 
 I think that Gouldner, perhaps more so than any other Twentieth Century 
sociologist, was a ‘critical theorist’ in precisely this sense.  He was, without equal, the 
sociologist whose mission was to elaborate this sense of what is critical about critical 
theory.  Yet, who reads Gouldner today?  Like his idea of critical theory, Gouldner 
himself is largely, though not completely, forgotten in criminology and the lessons of 
his scholarship are the awkward silences that fill the pages of too many ‘journal 
article sociologies’, as Feagin et al (1991: 270, cited in Ferrell, 1999: 402) put it.  It is 
uncommon indeed to encounter a criminologist with anything other than a vague 
familiarity with Gouldner and even among those who do read his work there is a 
tendency to skip over some of its most important parts. 
 In The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970) there is a lengthy section 
on the work of Talcott Parsons to which the preceding 160 pages is ‘merely a preface’ 
(Gouldner, 1970: 167).  This section of the book is crucial not only to Gouldner’s 
sense of sociology’s impending crisis but also to his definition of what is critical 
about critical scholarship and, incidentally, why Parsons’s work cannot be described 
as ‘critical’.  Yet there are few acknowledgements in the sociological or 
criminological literature to this crucial discussion or the issues it raises.  The section 
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is subtitled ‘The World of Talcott Parsons’ and takes up a weighty 171 pages of the 
book (Gouldner, 1970: 167-338).  Now, anyone with even the most cursory training in 
the languages of social theory can recognise the ambiguity of the subtitle.  It can refer, 
and Gouldner uses it to refer explicitly, to two things simultaneously.  In the first 
sense, it is used to reference the world that Talcott Parsons describes; that is, the 
world according to Parsons, or the world of Talcott Parsons.  In the second sense, it is 
used to refer to the world in which Parsons lives as a socially and historically situated 
individual; that is, the world of Talcott Parsons.  However, paying proper attention to 
the lengthy (and dense) discussion reveals that whilst Gouldner does reveal a 
catalogue of deficiencies in Parsons’s work – the ways that his theory fails to account 
for extant realities – and whilst he also reveals how those extant realities provide both 
resources for and challenges to Parsonsian sociology, neither of these critiques is what 
really interests him. 
 Gouldner’s argument is that ‘Parsonsian theory’ is the simultaneity, the 
embeddedness of these two different senses in each other and, as the canny 
dialectician that he is, this proposition gives rise to a third meaning of the subtitle.  
This third meaning arises out of an elision between the representational and 
constitutive character of Parsons’s sociological categories (see below).  ‘The World of 
Talcott Parsons’, then, refers to the way that the description (sense 1) and the thing 
described (sense 2) are unified in a particular sociology of an historically situated 
social formation characterised by economic, political and cultural tensions and 
ambiguities; that is, the world of Talcott Parsons.  As Gouldner himself puts it, the 
‘mountains of categories to which Parsons’ labours have given birth’ are ‘not to be 
understood merely as scientifically instrumental or as useful for research’.  Instead, 
‘their fungus-like capacity to grow out in all directions from a single spore and to 
cover the entire territory in shingled layers’ reveals their constitutive, rather than 
analytical character.  Gouldner continues that they ‘function as a symbolic 
representation and constitution of the social world’s oneness’ (Ibid: 209.  Original 
emphasis). 
 When you grasp what Gouldner was getting at you realize that Parsons is 
simply an instance, an exemplification of a more general tendency in the relationship 
between sociology and the world in which it is practised.  Certainly, Parsons was an 
apt choice because of the enormous international significance of his work.  But 
Gouldner could equally have applied the exercise to Mills or Merton, Smelser or 
Michels, Homans or Goffman (see ibid: 169).  In the same way, contemporary social 
scientists might apply Gouldner’s analytical principles to important social theorists 
like Giddens, Habermas or Bauman and doing so, in fact, might go some way towards 
reducing the dependence of sociological criminologies on the legislative power of the 
former’s pronouncements.  For, Gouldner’s point is not to say that Parsons was stupid 
– far from it; nor simply to say that he was wrong – again, far from it.  His point was 
to show that Parsons’s particular synthesis, or expression of the ‘oneness’ of the 
world was not critical.  It was not critical because it did not exhibit a knowledge of 
how the world and the theory were related to each other or, at least, the exhibition was 
deficient in too many respects. 
 
On critical criminologies 
 
I admit that this has been a long preface (although not as long as Gouldner’s!) but the 
whole issue of Gouldner’s critique of appreciative studies of deviance – his caustic 
dismissal of the ‘Becker School’ – only makes any real sense when this meaning of 
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‘critical’ is properly understood.  His charge that the Becker School ‘expresses the 
romanticism of the zoo curator who preeningly displays his rare specimens’ (1973: 
37-8) is born of the same sense of what a ‘critical theory’ is as his charge against 
Parsons’s fungus-like ‘mountains of categories’ and their ‘constitution of the world’s 
oneness’.  In my view, many sociological criminologies pay little attention to this 
sense of ‘critical’ and it may be that it has been all but forgotten.  From a Gouldnerian 
point of view, the fundamental task facing a critical criminology is not to demonstrate 
that ‘traditional’, ‘mainstream’, ‘conventional’, and so on, criminology is wrong – 
even if ‘it’ is in fact wrong in various ways.  The fundamental task is to expose how 
‘theory’ and ‘world’ are not independent variables but critical unities in the 
development of a transformative criminology.  In turn, this is to say that whilst 
‘traditional’ criminology can and ought to be subjected to searching analysis and 
detailed critique it is equally important to ensure that the principles of critical analysis 
are applied to those criminologies that proclaim a critical heritage.  It is here, I 
contend, that the most important clues about the contemporary ‘deviant imagination’ 
(c.f., Pearson, 1975) are to be found: not in the objects of critical criminology’s 
critiques but in the ways that such criminologies represent and constitute the ‘world’ 
of crime. 
 With this injunction in mind, I want to look at three books that define 
themselves as being ‘critical’ in some criminological sense of that term.  I want to use 
these books to examine ‘The World of Critical Criminology’.  In fact, the ways that 
each defines its criticality are very different and this, in itself, is an instructive 
characteristic to which I will return.  The three books are Jeff Ferrell’s (2006) Empire 
of Scrounge, Simon Winlow and Steve Hall’s (2006) Violent Night, and Jock Young’s 
(2007) The Vertigo of Late Modernity.  Apart from the fact that each book is an 
excellent and revealing text in its own right, I have chosen them for two analytical 
reasons.  First, because whilst ostensibly written under the auspices of criminology, 
each is, in reality, a sociology of ‘Late Modernity’.  Secondly, in spite of this shared 
characteristic, they expose key tensions in the critical criminological enterprise.  In 
terms of the four definitions of ‘critical’ that I outlined in my prefatory comments, 
they adhere to and extol different combinations its meanings.  Briefly, Ferrell’s 
understanding of critical invokes a combination of sense 1 (opportunistic) and sense 4 
(political), with a sprinkling of sense 3 (ethical).  Winlow and Hall’s understanding of 
critical invokes sense 3 (ethical) with a sprinkling of sense 2 (immanent).  Young’s 
understanding relies heavily on sense 2 (immanent) with a nod to sense 4 (political). 
 Knowing something of the intellectual background of these criminological 
thinkers it is no surprise that their versions of ‘criticality’ differ.  Ferrell’s background 
in (anarchist) urban studies and his long-standing commitment to involving himself 
with denigrated and criminalized subcultures (see Ferrell, 1996; 2002) has generated a 
certain pragmatism in his criminological work.  The concatenation of urban 
ethnography and cultural criminology and the continuing deep immersion in the 
micro-worlds of anarchistic and marginalized constituencies imbues his writing with 
an open and experimental quality: a mission to ‘tell it like it is’ on the streets and 
railway lines, in the warehouses and trash piles of urban America.  Winlow and Hall’s 
work emerges out of a very different (national and) intellectual tradition.  Whilst 
Ferrell’s post-Becker appreciative sociology leads him to immerse himself fully in the 
worlds he investigates and to read out from those worlds an opportunistic critique of 
consumerism, urban capitalism, the regulation of public space and so on, Winlow and 
Hall’s post-CCCS, Marxist-inspired critical sociology leads them to a political 
critique of neo-liberal ideology.  Where they reject ‘purposeless analyses of allegedly 
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“transgressive” micro-exotica’ (Winlow & Hall, 2006: 195) in favour of ideology-
critique, Ferrell explores in the richest detail the humanistic, street-democratic 
sociality that characterises urban survival.  Young’s extensive engagement with 
sociological and criminological theory, his trans-Atlantic exposure to Anglo-
American cultural and social, as well as intellectual, traditions generates a far more 
guarded, if no less ambitious, attempt to make theory matter in the struggle to 
comprehend and respond to contemporary criminality.  In effect, Young’s work has to 
steer the careful course between the demands of linking theory ‘to a real social 
practice’ and the costs of the ‘theory and practice of voyeurism’ (see Young, 1975: 
69, 91). 
 For all that the three books attempt to demarcate their critical constructions of 
the world of crime, and for all that each competes with the others in their 
criminological grasp of that world, they do share a common characteristic.  The 
shared characteristic, as I mentioned earlier, is that each text is a sociology of ‘Late 
Modernity’ and each seeks to draw a contrast – sometimes explicit, sometimes 
implicit – between the world as it is and the world as it was.  It is in this contrast, and 
the ways that the current arrangement of things are presented, that ‘The World of 
Critical Criminology’, in the Gouldnerian sense, makes its most vivid appearance. 
 If we begin with what the three books have in common it is clear that each 
owes a very heavy debt to recent sociological writings on consumerism and, in 
particular, to the version of consumerism associated with the work of Zygmunt 
Bauman.  Moreover, each book strikes a remarkably similar pose in its confrontation 
with this phenomenon.  For, consumerism today is taken as the predominant 
relationship between the mass of the citizenry and the ‘developed’ world’s 
institutional and political structures.  Although how present consumerism relates to 
past consumerism is hardly addressed at all.  In Bauman’s words: 
 
‘In its present late-modern, second-modern or post-modern stage, society 
engages its members – again primarily – in their capacity as consumers’ 
(Bauman, 1998a: 24) 
 
I will not, here, delve into the too-easy way that Bauman has skipped over the 
problematic transition from his profession of a ‘postmodernity’ characterised by 
indeterminacy, ambivalence, ‘inconclusiveness, motility and rootlessness’ (Bauman, 
1992: 192, 203) to a ‘liquid modernity’ characterised by fluidity, disengagement and 
interchangeability (Bauman, 2000: 6, 11, 13.  See also Bauman, 2004: 117, 123).  In 
theoretical terms the transition is immensely problematic but it has been totally 
ignored in the criminological, and largely ignored in the sociological, literature.  I 
merely observe the fact that this repositioning of his intellectual agenda has enabled 
criminologists more easily to ‘Baumanise’ their accounts of the malaise of the 
contemporary world – precisely because the repositioning means that the difficult 
epistemological and ontological questions about the status of (‘post’) social scientific 
knowledge no longer get in the way.  Bauman has, to all intents and purposes, 
‘liquidated’ his postmodern assets and invested them in normal sociology’s ‘modern’ 
narratives.  The repositioning is visible across large slices of sociological 
criminologies. 
For example, with Bauman taking up an impressive twenty index entries to 
ground their analysis of ‘consumer capitalism’, Winlow and Hall (2006: 79) write that 
‘consumerism’: 
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‘… placed an almost dreamlike hue over everyday life, and we seemed to 
levitate above the wreckage as the growing cult of hyper-individualism and 
the process of social fragmentation battered away at traditional forms of social 
capital.  In the midst of this, consumerism’s incessantly probing and 
suffocating marketing industry imbued manufactured objects with an almost 
mystical lifestyle symbolism, to the extent that the acquisition of these objects 
[…] became essential building blocks in the construction of status, identity 
and self-worth’. 
 
Indeed, so incessantly suffocating and profoundly effective has consumerism become 
that the whole of popular culture, and the education system to boot, ‘are now in the 
advanced stages of recruitment into the business of trimming thoughts and practices 
down to functional essentials and energizing the desire for personal success and 
hedonistic rewards’ (Ibid: 69).  One is bound to wonder, of course, how Winlow and 
Hall have managed to escape the trimming and the suffocation in order to tell the tale 
of its deleterious consequences.  Whilst I do not want to diminish the significance of 
this question I would like to move away from a probe of personal standpoints and take 
note of the language in which these propositions are put.  What we see, here, is a very 
clear demarcation between a recent past and the present.  The impact of consumerism 
is related in the past tense: ‘it’ placed and imbued, ‘we’ seemed and ‘they’ became.  
The language is that of the done deal, the language of reminiscence, of historical 
event rather than historical process.  It is a language that has the effect of abstracting 
from the recent past the meanings and desires, the struggles and the contradictions of 
those, including myself, who lived though it.  It is only on this basis that the 
contrasting use of the present tense to describe the trimming of thoughts and practices 
and energizing desires makes any real sense.  For, if consumerism were not a done 
deal, the question of how and under what circumstances consumerism contradictorily 
trimmed and expanded, energized and exhausted thoughts and desires (ignoring, for  
present purposes, the fundamentally contentious quality of Winlow and Hall’s initial 
proposition) would become central, as would a politically sensitive grasp of the daily 
practices of individuals and groups living those contradictions.  In turn, another 
question is then raised about this linguistic formulation of apparently empirical 
description: when does the past end and the present begin?  In spite of relating events 
that transpired within the lifetime of a single generation the past has become remote in 
relation to the immediacy of the present.  The present is now, and now, and now: it is, 
to all intents and purposes, a procession of instants, each of which falls ‘indelibly into 
the past’ in Don Delillo’s poignant words (DeLillo, 1998: 60) as the next replaces it: 
‘a culture of the absolute present’, in Bauman’s terms (Bauman 1998b:90). 
Jeff Ferrell, on the other hand, makes not a mention of Bauman.  Yet, much of 
his grasp of consumerism might have been taken directly from any one of the latter’s 
recent books, perhaps indicating how well Bauman has captivated the zeitgeist of 
critical social scientists.  Like Winlow and Hall, Ferrell has become entranced by the 
problem of consumerism and whilst the critique of urban regulation has always been 
streaked with anti-consumerist themes, his experiences with America’s trash piles 
have brought these themes to the fore.  The ‘culture and economy of consumption,’ 
writes Ferrell, ‘promotes not only endless acquisition, but the steady disposal of 
yesterday’s purchases by consumers who, awash in their own impatient insatiability, 
must make room for tomorrow’s next round of consumption’ (Ferrell, 2006: 28).  This 
is, in all but grammatical construction, the same as Bauman’s assertion that 
consumerism: 
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‘… is not about accumulating goods (who gathers goods must put up as well 
with heavy suitcases and cluttered houses), but about using them and 
disposing of them after use to make room for other goods and their uses’ 
(Bauman, 2003: 49.  Emphasis in original) 
 
For Ferrell, this ‘programmed insatiability … creates and sustains among its adherents 
a sort of existential vacancy – a personal void, a material longing promoted by the 
same corporate advertisers whose products promise its resolution’ (2006: 28, 162).  
Notwithstanding important empirical questions about which real person’s void Ferrell 
is talking about and whether the materiality of each different real person’s longing is 
identical – it is surely at least one task of a critical criminology to account for the 
subtlety and nuance of experience, desire and awareness – there are implicit 
propositions about America’s past and present being made here.  Thus, one is forced 
to assume, before a consumerist mentality ripped out the soul of American culture, 
that culture’s protagonists exhibited (at least the possibility of) an existential 
compulsion, a willed satisfaction and perhaps even an idealistic aversion to material 
acquisition.  For, if this were not the case, then the alleged existential and 
programmed qualities of contemporary consumerism could not be held responsible for 
the peculiar characteristics of ‘Late Modern’ marginalisation and criminalisation.  
Like Winlow and Hall – but a physical and ideological ocean apart from them – 
Ferrell’s tales of the city are fuelled by a sense of an historical schism.  It is a schism 
whose impacts are experienced particularly sharply not by the marginalised and the 
criminalised themselves – i.e., not by those subcultures whose ways of life amount to 
responses to positions in an antagonistic class structure, as the original ‘new 
criminology’ of subcultures proposed – but by the ordinary people of modern 
America: the citizen-‘sheep’ (Ferrell, 1996: 176) whose ideological programming 
leads them to an ‘existential affirmation of domination and control’ (Ferrell, 2006: 
192). 
It should be no surprise that Jock Young is the most wary of the authors I have 
chosen and the least inclined to propose a one-dimensional consumerism.  
Nonetheless, characteristically more subtle and double-edged as it is, Young’s 
account of the world of contemporary criminality rests similarly on a strict division of 
historical experience.  It is a division formulated most eloquently in The Exclusive 
Society where Young (1999: 193) compares the ‘movement into late modernity [as] 
like a ship which has broken from its moorings’.  Tellingly, however, he does not 
consider what it might mean if the ship were ‘like’ a cruise-liner, a destroyer, an oil-
tanker or if it were ‘like a ship manned by galley slaves’ (Mills, 2000: 39).  It is not 
the ship itself that is the object of Young’s assessment but the socio-political ocean on 
which it floats.  Where, in the past, there was certainty and solidity, solidarity and 
connection, now there is angst and ephemerality, isolation and dissonance. In The 
Vertigo of Late Modernity, Young quotes with approval Gabriel and Lang’s (1995: 
190) conclusion that the consequence of consumerism is that marginality ‘will 
paradoxically become central’ and reiterates Bauman’s assertion that ‘the poor’ 
amount to ‘flawed consumers’ (Young, 2007: 46, 52).  Explaining ‘social bulimia’ 
(the process of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion), Young writes that it ‘involves 
the incorporation of mainstream social values of success, wholehearted acceptance of 
the American (or First World) Dream, and a worship of consumer success and 
celebrity’ (Ibid: 47).  Again, I want to draw attention to the language in which this 
thesis is formulated: ‘incorporation’, ‘wholehearted acceptance’ and ‘worship’.  
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Young’s historical division may be drawn less sharply but its drawing is no less 
effective.  Where the generations of the ‘Golden Years’ of the world of post-war 
capitalism lived in their historical present and perceived themselves, felt themselves 
as belonging to that world, the generations of the Late Modern world live elsewhere, 
perhaps anywhere but in the historical present of this world.  ‘Late modernity’, writes 
Young (Ibid: 197), ‘is a society of the elsewhere’; it is a globalised, neo-liberal, post-
Fordist, marketised, consumerist-oriented, star-struck, hedonistic, post-Golden Age 
world of cultural disconnection, broken life narratives and shattered collective 
symbols.   
Of course, what Young derives from these claims is different to what Ferrell 
and Winlow and Hall derive from them.  Whilst the latter authors conclude that 
consumerism engenders a ‘personal void’ or a ‘dream-like’ ‘trimming of thoughts and 
practices’, Young concludes that consumerism results in a ‘fear of falling’ – an 
existential angst (rather than vacancy) about whether and how the individual’s social 
status and identity can be sustained and nurtured.  Where Ferrell and Winlow and Hall 
find cultural sheep and cultural dopes, Young finds tensions between passion and 
tedium (see Young, 2007: 21, 169 et passim), between the ‘organic community of the 
past’ and the ‘new community of the Generalized Elsewhere’ (Ibid: 212). The 
differences between their particular conclusions notwithstanding – and there is also 
some very lively debate between Ferrell and Winlow & Hall on this – the world they 
all describe is, nonetheless, very similar indeed.  It is a world in which ‘citizens’ have 
become ‘consumers’; a world where the practice, status and identity of individuals is 
no longer a socio-political matter in the critical sociological sense: a matter of 
habitation, habituation, normativeness, but is a cultural matter of (mis)identification, 
desire, symbolization.  It is, in short, a (leastwise lexical) universe apart from the 
world of Talcott Parsons – or Alvin Gouldner, for that matter. 
 Now, I do not want to suggest that the focus on consumerism is itself the 
difference between these sociological worlds. For, if it really were the difference 
between them then some rather awkward empirical and theoretical questions would 
follow – such as how post-Golden Age consumerism differs from pre-Golden Age 
consumerism or how twentieth century consumerism is different from nineteenth 
century consumerism, and so on.  In other words, in what ways, specifically, does the 
(mis)identification, desire, symbolization of post-1960s consumerism differ from the 
(mis)identification, desire, symbolization of earlier consumerisms and why have these 
now resulted in voided, angst-ridden or deluded existential conditions?  In fact, 
consumerism has come to stand in for or has come to be used as the proxy for a 
deeper thesis about the ‘Late Modern’ malaise.  It functions theoretically as shorthand 
for a large array of sub-propositions about how the contemporary scene is deficient 
when reflected in the mirror of the past.   
  
On modernising zoos 
 
What is of particular significance in this exploration of contemporary criminological 
accounts of modern social life is that the terms used to render its depiction convincing 
are not analytically innocent.  Theoretical method, writes Charles Lemert,  ‘entails its 
own, and powerful, empirical capacity’ (Lemert, 1998: 181).  The particular occasion 
for Lemert’s remark was a reflection on the work of Anthony Giddens but the 
observation is important to all sociological theory that expounds upon the character of 
the empirical world.  This is because sociological concepts always have a dual 
quality: on the one hand they are intended as distinctive items in a theoretical agenda 
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that may be applied across instances to test their general utility.  On the other hand, 
they have the capacity (and the tendency) to substitute for the generality of the 
instances as if ‘drawing the reader outside the passive role of reading into an odd, but 
palpable contact with the world being read’ (Ibid: 184).  Actually, a similar 
observation was made by Mills in his critique of ‘abstracted empiricism’ where he 
noted a ‘pronounced tendency to confuse whatever is to be studied with the set of 
methods suggested for its study’ (Mills, 2000: 51).  Lemert was simply establishing 
that theoretical method is no different in this regard to empirical method.  In fact, the 
dual quality of sociological concepts, and its analytical consequences, lies at the heart 
of Gouldner’s original critique of both Talcott Parsons and Howard Becker.  Talcott 
Parsons’s work encased the world in ‘shingled layers’ of categories and Becker’s 
‘Cool’ rendered the world of deviance as exotica.  The reason for this was not 
(primarily, at least) because of some personal ambition or naïve intention on the part 
of Parsons and Becker.  The reason for it was because of the unacknowledged elision 
between the two qualities of sociological concepts I introduced above: the quality of 
empirical representation and the quality of theoretical constitution.  It should be 
noted, here, that ‘constitutive’ sociologies are especially vulnerable to the dangers of 
elision, which is why Lemert emphasised the issue in Giddens’s work, but all 
sociologies face the problem of sustaining the distinction between the representative 
and constitutive dimensions of their concepts. 
 The question, then, is: what is the ‘world of critical criminology’ represented 
in the three chosen texts and is the particular synthesis of ‘theory’ and ‘world’ (the 
representational and constitutive) ‘critical’ in the Gouldnerian sense?  If we apply 
Gouldner’s injunctions in the strictest terms and attend to the postulated architecture 
of that world as a whole then the answer must be no, or not yet.  No criminology that 
truncates historical experience and the historical process into such short time-frames 
can be understood as critical in Gouldner’s sense of that term.  This is not because the 
history is inadequate (even though, in too many instances, it is inadequate – especially 
in the overdrawn contrast between the present and the so-called ‘Golden Age’).  It is 
because such an accounting procedure fails to recognise itself as part of the crisis of 
sociology that Gouldner had exposed.  Its consequence, in Gouldner’s (1970: 390) 
terms, is to fix ‘perspective in aesthetic standards, in the appearance of things’ rather 
than in their historical essence.  Ironically, the shortening of historical time-frames 
and the truncation of historical experience places emphasis not on people as active 
social agents, as socially- and historically-embedded beings, but on the characteristics 
of their external environment. ‘From the viewpoint of much of the sociology 
dominant in the United States today’, wrote Gouldner, ‘it is not man but society that is 
the measure’.  Where once this focus may have been ‘benign’, today: 
 
‘… this sociology’s inherent subordination of the individual to the group 
serves, not so much as a reminder to men of their debt to one another, but as a 
rationale for conformity to the status quo, for obedience to established 
authority, and for a restraint that makes haste slowly, it becomes a warning 
about limits rather than an invitation to pursue opportunities.’  (Gouldner, 
1970: 508) 
 
Now it may seem strange to be quoting Gouldner’s warning against the neglect of 
social agents in a discussion of such different sociological criminologists as Ferrell, 
Winlow and Hall and Young.  Yet, constituting a historically truncated consumerism 
as the ‘world’ of crime is in danger of simply updating the subordination to which 
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Gouldner refers.  However much the language may have changed and however much 
the ‘cultural turn’ has impacted upon sociological criminologies it remains 
fundamentally unclear how ‘consumerism’, as the conceptual generality of instances 
of experience, drives criminality as such or, even more basically, how this driving 
force itself can be empirically instanced as a peculiarity of Late Modernity. 
 Of course, the three authors differ in their attempted resolution of this 
dilemma.  Winlow and Hall suggest that the neo-capitalist system, and its neo-liberal 
ideology, has ‘infiltrated’ culture to such an extent that popular ‘micro-transgressions’ 
are no more than hedonistic rituals of consumerist affirmation or pointlessly fleeting 
displays of dissatisfaction that are destined always to be captured by the ideological 
and economic system.  What causes violent (and, presumably, all other?) crime is the 
demise of organic communities, the loss of social solidarity and ‘conviviality in 
interpersonal relationships’ (Winlow & Hall, 2006: 195).  Criminality, here, may not 
be the caged reality of the zookeeper’s specimens and may not express the attitude of 
the ‘wild-life conservationist’ (Young, 1975: 69) but it is certainly the bounded 
territory of the ranger’s safari park.  The landscape of the native species has been 
disturbed; the balance has been upset and they have reacted with petulant violence 
and a ferocious hedonism, squabbling in the rotting pile of capitalism’s bittersweet 
fruits.  There is no way out of the park and resistance (from within) is futile. 
 Ferrell, on the other hand, appears optimistic in comparison but the optimism 
overlays a not dissimilar grasp of the thwarted ambition of modern society.  
Transformed into a ‘perpetual panic intermingled with momentary, gulping 
gratification’ (Ferrell, 2006: 189), today’s ‘hyperconsumptive economies’ have 
produced ‘all manner of deformities’ in lived urban realities (Ibid: 172-3).  These 
‘deformities’ include gated communities, surveillance systems and guard dogs to 
sustain a separation between the city’s class-cultures.  In this context, it is worth 
recalling Young’s (1969) essay on the ‘zoo-keepers of deviancy’ since the only thing 
that appears to have changed in almost four decades is the technical mechanics of 
sustaining the separation.  Thus, wrote Young: 
 
‘… class is segregated from class, young people from old, rich people from 
poor, criminals from non-criminals, coloured people from whites.  Moreover 
even when there is actual physical propinquity social distances maintain 
segregation of a very real sort.’ (Young, 1987: 210) 
 
Still, historical continuity is not really on Ferrell’s mind in his ethnography of 
scrounging.  Instead, Ferrell’s goal is actively to search for ways out of the safari park 
and he finds on the margins of urban existence those little bits of anarchy and 
subversion that point to something other than the consumption-driven, ideologically 
blinkered ‘normality’ of public and private life.  He goes on to suggest that 
criminologists celebrate the ‘seedy parts of town’ for the insights they offer into the 
(over-) regulated character of late modern, hyperconsumptive society and the 
alternatives they offer.  Remaking space, refashioning time, rebuilding personal 
connections with urban space, Ferrell’s outsider’s are the late modern situationists, the 
hybrid forms of urban conflict.  Here, the marginalized constituencies of the Empire 
of Scrounge are the ones who have escaped: they are the exotica looking back through 
the fence at the enclosed and managed inhabitants. 
 Young’s late modern world differs from both Winlow and Hall’s and Ferrell’s.  
Neither a total system that absorbs all resistant acts nor a landscape whose deformities 
coagulate class segregations, Young’s world is a world of communal detachment, 
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social indifference and cultural discontinuity.  In the disengaged urbanism of the Late 
Modern city no-one lives any longer in the here and now: the great urban populations, 
like the myriad ‘cultures’ to which they (disjointedly) belong, have become detached 
from each other and from any fixed points in space and time.  Thus, there is no shared 
political vision, no mutually reinforcing value system, no communally validated 
cultural script through which to grasp the present or face the future.  There is only the 
‘seduction of a culture which at once attracts yet undermines all sense of one’s own 
worth and identity’ (Young, 2007:153).  The ‘slow riot of crime and violence’ that 
besets this Late Modern society is really an ‘eruption’ of the tensions that ‘haunt the 
everyday world’, fuelled by the ‘bulimia’ of ‘massive cultural inclusion … 
accompanied by systematic structural exclusion’  (Ibid: 32,180-81).  For all that 
Young wishes to avoid a one-sided ‘dystopian’ pessimism (Ibid: 210), and for all that 
he attempts to find some hope in the ‘hyperpluralist’ cosmopolitanism of the 
contemporary city it is difficult to avoid the impression that Late Modernity is less 
‘like a ship’ and more like an animal laboratory (although both, interestingly, are 
tightly enclosed spaces) in which small animals, forced to confront an alien 
environment, act ‘as if’ it were their home whilst simultaneously being precisely not 
‘at’ home.  Like a rodent running on a wheel, Late Modernity, to repeat Young’s 
striking depiction, ‘attracts yet undermines all sense of one’s own worth and identity’. 
 It is, of course, impossible to avoid the elision of the representational and the 
constitutive qualities of sociological categories but this does not mean that the 
problem merits no careful attention.  What we are encounter in the three chosen 
critical criminologies are three represented worlds of crime rooted in one constituted 
division between past and present.  In fact, that division is the fulcrum around which 
the description of crime’s contexts is made to revolve. Yet, I suggest, it is precisely 
this division that, for Winlow and Hall, frees the deviants from their zoos and gives 
them a whole safari park in which to fight with each other.  It is this division that 
renders Ferrell’s outsiders as the hybridising escapees from the park’s over-regulated 
enclaves.  It is this division that fuels Young’s mournful empathy with the tedious 
existence of the Late Modern lab rat. 
The sociological difference between past and present is not a simple empirical 
question.  It is dependent on theoretical method, which is to say that the difference 
must be constituted theoretically and requires explicit engagement with the dual role 
of sociological categories.  What happens when the present is cut adrift from the past 
theoretically and made into a rapaciously consumerist, mentally vacuous, 
experientially tedious and ideologically suborned island is that its inhabitants lose 
their agency. It places the present in a perpetual stasis and transforms ordinary 
people’s lives into a Sisyphean labour of endless futility.  I am in no way suggesting 
that such a view is of necessity empirically wrong but I do suggest that it is 
insufficient theoretically to be considered a critical analysis in Gouldner’s terms.  Nor 
am I proposing that Gouldner’s version of a critical theory is the only valid version of 
that endeavour but I do think that it is instructive and valuable to take seriously the 
different roles that concepts play in representing and constituting the world of crime. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Whilst the world of critical criminology is obviously more variegated than the world 
of Talcott Parsons it remains the case that Gouldner’s original critique continues to 
expose tensions in the critical criminological enterprise.  If we follow Gouldner’s 
analysis we find that zookeeping is less a characteristic of some sociologies rather 
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than others and more a characteristic of all sociologies.  Gouldner’s, often caustic but 
always insightful critiques of sociology – whether of Parsons and his followers or the 
welfare state-dependent young men of the post-war Golden Age or the self-
righteously ‘value-free’ technicians of the military-industrial complex – were not 
opportunistic, ethical, immanent or political complaints.  They were critical analyses 
of the ways that sociological theory constitutes the world in order to represent both its 
problems and prospects.  They were, in short, lessons to social scientists of all stripes 
about the perennial danger of caging active social agents in zoos – whether Late 
Modern, or otherwise. 
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